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A rotulação de notícias de violência varia.  O mesmo 
ato de violência pode ser rotulado como 
“terrorismo”, “tiroteio”, ou “fúria”.  Apesar das teorias e 
pesquisas sobre a relação entre mídia e terrorismo, 
ainda não está claro quando as agências de notícias 
rotularão a violência como “terrorismo” e com que 
frequência o rótulo será usado. Concentrando-me 
principalmente na rotulação do “terrorismo”, em 
Geometria social e o selo do “terrorismo” utilizo a 
estratégia da “geometria social” para desenvolver 
sete proposições que explicam e preveem 
parcialmente a rotulação moral da violência. Esses 
princípios aumentam nossa compreensão da 
rotulação do “terrorismo”, mas também esclarecem a 
questão mais ampla de como o desvio é definido. 
The news labeling of violence varies.  The 
same act of violence may be labeled 
“terrorism”, a “shooting”, or a “rampage”.  
Despite theory and research on the 
relationship between the media and 
terrorism, it is still unclear when news outlets 
will label violence “terrorism” and how 
frequently the label will be used.  Focusing 
primarily on “terrorism” labeling, I use the 
strategy of “social geometry” to develop 
seven propositions that partially explain and 
predict the moral news labeling of violence. 
These principles increase our understanding 
of “terrorism” labeling, but also illuminate the 
broader issue of how deviance is defined. 
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Introduction1 
 
cholars have long been interested in the relationship between terrorism and the news 
media. Indeed, research has focused on, among other things, terrorists’ strategic use of 
the media (see, e.g., WEIMANN, 2005), the psychological impacts of terrorism news 
coverage (see, e.g., SLONE, 2000), the news framing of terrorism (see, e.g., NORRIS, KERN, and 
JUST, 2003), and the quantity of terrorism reporting (see, e.g., KEARNS, BETUS, and LEMIEUX, 
2019). For example, a recent study on the quantity of terrorism reporting finds that terrorist 
attacks in the United States involving Muslim perpetrators receive 357% more news coverage than 
similar attacks by non-Muslim perpetrators (Ibid.). While this literature has contributed to a 
better understanding of the relationship between terrorism and the media, it is still unclear when 
news outlets will label violence “terrorism”. 
Determining whether an act of violence is “terrorism” is not easy. After all, there is no 
consensus definition of terrorism. Not surprisingly, there is often much confusion and debate 
about labeling in the aftermath of significant violence. For example, the day after the 2015 attack 
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by Dylann Roof at a Charleston, South Carolina church the New York Times ran an article titled 
“Many Ask, Why Not Call Church Shooting Terrorism?” (GLADSTONE, 06/18/2015).  This leads 
to the central question, when are the labels “terrorism” and “terrorists” used to describe violence 
and its perpetrators? And once these labels are used, what explains their frequency? To be clear, 
some have offered explanations (see section titled “Exploring the ‘Terrorism’ Label”). However, a 
logically consistent set of theoretical propositions that explain and predict the likelihood and 
frequency of “terrorism” labeling is lacking. 
The literature on social control will not provide a great deal of help answering these 
questions. Theory and research on deviant labels are underdeveloped. Sociologists who study 
social control, as a form of conflict management (see CAMPBELL and MANNING, 2019), have 
largely neglected the topic of the distribution of deviant labels in favor of developing theory 
intended to explain variation in responses to deviance. One notable exception to the lack of 
scholarship on deviant labels is prior work on “mental illness” labeling (HORWITZ, 1982).  
However, “terrorism” is a different type of deviant label and demands a different explanation. 
In short, I address two gaps related to “terrorism” labeling and social control in this paper.  
First, regarding the “terrorism” label, no prior theory has developed a logically consistent set of 
simple, testable, and general propositions that explain and predict the likelihood and frequency 
of “terrorism” labeling by the news media in response to violence. Second, regarding social 
control, there has been a major emphasis on investigating the responses to deviance at the expense 
of explaining how deviance is defined. 
To fill these gaps, I offer seven tentative propositions that partially explain and predict moral 
news labeling in response to violence. Four of these propositions predict “terrorism” labeling, two 
focus on positive and neutral labeling, and one helps to address the evolution of moral labeling. 
They are as follows: 
 
1. “Terrorism” labeling varies directly with the relational distance between the 
perpetrator(s) and target(s).  
2. “Terrorism” labeling is greater in response to attacks perpetrated against more 
conventional targets than against less conventional targets.   
3. “Terrorism” labeling is greater in response to attacks perpetrated against more organized 
targets than against less organized targets.  
4. “Terrorism” labeling increases with the social closeness of news outlets to the target(s) 
and social distance from the perpetrator(s).   
5. Positive news labeling increases with the social closeness of news outlets to the 
perpetrator(s) and social distance from the target(s).  
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6. Neutral news labeling is a direct function of the isosceles triangulation of social closeness 
between the three participants.      
7. Variation in moral news labeling is a direct function of social diversity. 
 
To help me develop these formulations, I employed the strategy of “social geometry” 
invented by Donald Black (see BLACK, 1995; CAMPBELL and MANNING, 2019). Before 
discussing the evidence in favor of these propositions, I want to reconceptualize news labeling as 
a form of social control and provide an overview of social geometry. In order to do that, I must 
first discuss variation in news labeling and prior explanations of the “terrorism” label.  
 
 
Exploring the ‘Terrorism’ Label 
 
The news labels used to describe violence vary. The same act of violence may be labeled 
“terrorism”, a “shooting”, or a “rampage”. Perpetrators are often deemed “terrorists”, “bombers”, 
“killers”, “madmen”, or “crazed gunmen”. Consider the following examples: 
 
• The Wall Street Journal reports that Dylann Roof, the perpetrator of the 2015 “killings” 
of nine individuals in Charleston, South Carolina’s historically black Emanuel African 
Methodist Episcopal Church, is a “‘loner’” (BAUERLEIN, LEVITZ, and KAMP, 
06/18/2015). 
• The New York Times quotes New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton 
calling the 2014 attack, by “hatchet-wielding” Zale Thompson, against four New York 
City police officers a “‘terrorist act’” (SCHWIRTZ and RASHBAUM, 10/24/2014). 
• Scott Shane (04/16/2013) from the New York Times writes that the “bombing of the 
Boston Marathon” by Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev marks “the end of more than a 
decade in which the United States experienced strikingly few terrorist attacks”. 
• The editorial board of USA Today (06/12/2009) calls James Wenneker von Brunn, the 
perpetrator of the 2009 attack at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
Washington, D.C., “a deranged…anti-Semitic gunman”. 
 
What explains this variation in news labeling?  And specifically, what explains the likelihood 
and frequency of “terrorism” labeling? A survey of the literature produces five major explanations.  
First, variation in “terrorism” labeling results from a lack of consensus over the definition of the 
term (NACOS, 2007 [2002]).2 Second, the news media adopts the “terrorism” label in response to 
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violence only after it has been used by legitimate news sources like the state (BUDDENBAUM, 
1991; DOBKIN, 1992). Third, the news labeling of violence, including “terrorism” labeling, is a 
function of the cultural and ideological beliefs of the evaluators, be they journalists (see PICARD, 
1993) or editors (MARTIN and DRAZNIN, 1991). Fourth, recent attacks, as opposed to past 
instances, serve to influence the type of violence the news media considers “terrorism” for a period 
of several years (JENKINS, 2003). Finally, disparate studies demonstrate that attributes of 
terrorism, such as the nationality of the target(s), influence how it is labeled (see, e.g., WEIMANN, 
1985; SIMMONS and LOWRY, 1990). 
While each explanation has contributed to our understanding of “terrorism” labeling, they 
are all limited in that they do not provide a logically consistent set of simple, testable, and general 
propositions that explain and predict the likelihood and frequency of “terrorism” labeling in 
response to violence. To help me fill this gap in the literature and develop such propositions (see 
HOMANS, 1967), I reconceptualize news labeling as a form of social control. 
 
 
News Labeling as Social Control 
 
Deviance is immoral behavior and social control is the definition of, and response to, 
deviance (BLACK, 2010 [1976]). The news media often engages in social control. Specifically, 
news outlets engage in defining or labeling deviant behavior. A good example is “terrorism” 
labeling. News outlets may describe violence as “terrorism” and its perpetrators as “terrorists.” 
“Terrorism” and “terrorists” are negative labels – they declare attacks and their perpetrators 
morally wrong. “Terrorism’s” negative connotation is demonstrated by people’s reluctance to 
describe themselves as “terrorists”. For example, while members of Hamas embrace the labels 
“fighter” and “mujahedeen”, they see the actions of the Israeli government as “terrorism” 
(SPECKHARD, 2012). 
“Terrorism” and “terrorist” are not the only negative labels. “War” is arguably more negative 
than “terrorism”. On September 12, 2001 President George W. Bush said the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon the day before were “more than acts of terror. They were acts of 
war” (NEW YORK TIMES, 09/13/2001). “Genocide” is another negative label and often occurs 
in response to downward mass violence – by more powerful actors, such as the state, against less 
powerful groups.  As a result, “terrorism” does not always represent an increase in severity relative 
to other labels. It is one of many negative labels used to describe violence. 
Negative labels are not the only labels that are reported in response to violence. News outlets 
also report positive and neutral labels (see WEIMANN, 1985).  While positive news labels (e.g., 
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“liberation”) express social approval in response to violence, neutral news labels, in their purest 
form, make no moral judgment. However, in less pure forms, neutral labels express mild moral 
evaluations. For example, the news media may label an act of violence a “shooting”, a “bombing”, 
or a “killing”. Neutral framing also includes therapeutic labels, which often define perpetrators as 
mentally ill through words such as “crazy”, “sick”, and “depressed”. Each of the three categories 
of moral news labeling – positive, neutral, and negative – rest on a continuum varying from praise 
to condemnation. In this paper, my primary focus is negative labeling. However, I concentrate on 
the “terrorism” label and tend to leave other negative labels, such as “genocide”, for future 
analysis. Consistent with Black’s theory of social control (see CAMPBELL and MANNING, 2019), 
I use the strategy of social geometry to help me partially explain the likelihood and frequency of 
“terrorism” labeling in response to violence. 
 
 
Explaining the ‘Terrorism’ Label 
 
Donald Black argues that each form of social control has a corresponding social geometry.  
Suicide, gossip, avoidance, and all other forms of social control, including “terrorism” labeling, is 
isomorphic with its geometric configuration. The theoretical goal is to identify each behavior’s 
geometry. By doing so, we are stating the social conditions under which that behavior occurs.  
Afterwards, the geometry can be subject to empirical testing to assess its validity. 
To identify a behavior’s geometry is to find its location, direction, and distance along the five 
dimensions of social space. The vertical dimension is comprised of wealth and its distribution; the 
horizontal dimension is comprised of intimacy, integration, and interdependence; the symbolic 
dimension is comprised of culture; the corporate dimension is comprised of organization; and the 
normative dimension is comprised of social control. For example, feuding found among modern 
street gangs occurs laterally across moderate distances in the horizontal dimension, at moderate 
elevations in the corporate dimension, and at a vertical location significantly below third-party 
settlement agents (COONEY, 1998). If this geometry begins to change, the associated violence will 
also start to look different. For instance, holding all else constant, lowering the location of gang 
violence along the corporate dimension – in other words, changing the disputants from moderately 
organized groups to individuals – decreases the probability that the violence will be reciprocal. 
Since this explanatory strategy was first introduced in Black’s (2010 [1976]) theory of law, 
sociologists have employed geometric logic to explain different forms of social control, such as 
terrorism, lynching, rioting, vigilantism (SENECHAL DE LA ROCHE, 1996), genocide 
(CAMPBELL, 2015), domestic violence (BLACK, 2018), suicide (MANNING, 2012), and therapy 
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(TUCKER, 1999), while others have analyzed the social control of specific behavior such as suicide 
(Idem, 2015) and homicide (COONEY, 2009). While this literature has expanded our 
understanding of social control, most of it only explores the response to deviance and neglects the 
labeling of deviance itself. One notable exception is work on “mental illness” labeling by Horwitz 
(1982). Drawing on a wide array of data, Horwitz argues that geometric logic can explain and 
predict when someone is considered “mentally ill”. For example, the tendency to label someone 
“mentally ill” is a direct function of the cultural distance between the labeler and labeled. In other 
words, all else constant, as the labeler and labeled become more culturally heterogeneous the 
probability of being labeled “mentally ill” increases. Horwitz’s research is important because it 
helps identify the social principles conducive to therapeutic labeling. But because the “terrorism” 
label is a different type of deviant label, identifying its geometry helps move beyond therapeutic 
labeling and expand our understanding on how deviance is defined. 
With that said, how does social geometry explain the “terrorism” label? The likelihood and 
frequency of “terrorism” labeling in response to violence is partially a function of each attack’s 
geometric configuration in social space. By examining the social statuses of all the participants 
involved in each violent attack and the relations among them, we can begin to uncover geometric 
patterns conducive to the “terrorism” label. When trying to identify the geometry of the 
“terrorism” label it is important to ask, was the attack between intimates, such as family members, 
or between citizens of different countries? Was the attack perpetrated by immigrants, members 
of the ethnic minority, or social outcasts? Were the targets members of the ethnic majority or 
minority? Were they active members of their community or social hermits? Was the attack 
directed against an organization of some kind, such as a corporation or state? What about the 
social characteristics of third parties, such as the news outlets reporting on the attack, and their 
relations to the principals? 
It is important to recognize that social geometry does not explain all the variance in 
“terrorism” labeling. The nature of the violence also matters. For example, “terrorism” labeling is 
likely to increase as the number of casualties increase. Furthermore, some tactics are more likely to 
elicit “terrorism” labeling than others. Bombings are more associated with “terrorism” labeling 
than shootings (HUFF and KERTZER, 2018). Violence that targets everyone of a certain group, be 
it based on religion, nationality, or ethnicity, also seems to have a greater chance of being described 
as “terrorism” than more selective violence. While the “terrorism” label is likely to vary based upon 
the nature of the attack, I do not explore this variable here because there is a lack of data on the 
topic. Nevertheless, my propositions assume that the nature of violence is held constant. 
To help me develop my propositions and identify the social geometry conducive to the 
“terrorism” label, I draw mostly from recent research on portrayals of violence and terrorism in the 
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news media. I pay particular attention to acts of mass violence. The nature of small-scale violence, 
such as assault, homicide, and suicide, differs in too many respects from the nature of mass violence. 
It makes little sense to compare, for example, the labeling of intimate partner violence to the labeling 
of ethnic cleansing. Again, it is essential that we keep the nature of violence constant. While 
empirical reality makes this difficult, I try to approximate uniformity across cases when possible by 
focusing my analysis on mass violence. Additionally, because there are gaps in this literature, my 
formulations are only provisional – subject to future elaboration and qualification. Nevertheless, as 
Baele et al. write, prior research on terrorism and the news media makes “clear that the ‘terrorist’ 
label has a variable geometry” (BAELE et al., 2019, p. 523). Now we must identify it. 
 
 
The Geometry of the ‘Terrorism’ Label 
 
“Terrorism” labeling occurs across time and place. However, regardless of when and where 
“terrorism” is reported it is likely to have the same underlying sociological features. I argue that the 
likelihood and frequency of “terrorism” labeling by the news media in response to violence is 
greatest when (1) there is a high degree of relational distance between the perpetrator(s) and 
target(s), (2) the attack is perpetrated against more conventional targets, (3) the attack is perpetrated 
against more organized targets, and (4) the news outlet reporting on the attack is socially close to 




Relational distance is the degree to which people participate in each other’s lives (BLACK, 
2010 [1976]). Relational distance can be measured by “the scope, frequency, and length of 
interaction between people, the age of their relationship, and the nature and number of links 
between them in a social network” (Ibid., p. 41). I argue that as the level of intimacy between the 
perpetrator(s) and target(s) decreases the likelihood and frequency of “terrorism” labeling 
increases. Stated more formally: “Terrorism” labeling varies directly with the relational distance 
between the perpetrator(s) and target(s). 
A certain degree of relational distance is usually necessary for violence to be labeled 
“terrorism”. As a result, “terrorism” is rarely reported in response to intimate violence. This is often 
true for family rampage killings or familicide – the killing of multiple family members. For 
example, just after midnight on January 1, 2019, a Thai man, Sucheep Sornsung, killed six members 
of his family, including his two young children, at a New Year’s Eve party.  In response, The Daily 
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Telegraph (01/01/2019) labeled the incident a “mass shooting” and the perpetrator a “gunman”. 
The same logic applies to gang violence, school shootings, and workplace shootings. Despite often 
resulting in high death tolls, gang violence is rarely labeled “terrorism” because of the closeness of 
the disputants. Members of rival gangs are often acquaintances or residents of the same street, 
neighborhood, or city. Similarly, mass shootings that occur between students and co-workers are 
rarely labeled “terrorism” because of the intimacy between the parties. 
At first glance, the absence of clear political motive among the perpetrators of familicide, 
gang violence, and school and workplace shootings seem to account for the lack of “terrorism” 
labeling. However, some experts believe that motive is not an essential component of terrorism 
and determining if an attack is terrorism is easier when ignoring psychological mindsets (BLACK, 
2004; see also WEINBERG, PEDAHZUR, and HIRSCH-HOEFLER, 2004). After all, observing 
mental states is exceedingly difficult. That is not to say that the perpetrator’s motivation is 
irrelevant in influencing the labeling of violence. There is a higher probability of the public 
defining behavior as “terrorism” when the perpetrator’s motive is hatred, policy change, or 
governmental overthrow compared to a personal grievance (HUFF and KERTZER, 2018). 
Furthermore, in instances where perpetrators leave behind writings outlining their beliefs or 
pledge loyalty to already defined “terrorist” groups, motivation may have a significant impact on 
labeling. As a result, social geometry is probably most powerful predicting “terrorism” labeling in 
cases when motive is unclear. 
Research provides additional evidence that supports my provisional formulation on the 
negative association between intimacy and “terrorism” labeling. As Pete Simi writes, 
 
the media…in the United States are far more likely to refer to violent incidents linked to “international” 
groups as terrorist than violent incidents linked to domestic radicals…In terms of Middle Eastern 
terrorists, there is strong consensus about the danger they pose…Although white supremacists are 
highly stigmatized…they are not necessarily viewed as a significant terrorist threat…Instead the 
consensus regarding white supremacists typically involves characterizing them as…“incompetent,” and 
“disorganized” (SIMI, 2010, p. 254). 
 
Simi continues by writing that the media often believes domestic terrorism groups are little more 
than dysfunctional “‘boisterous loudmouths’” (Ibid., p. 266).  For example, in the early 2000s 
while the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), a group of clandestine cells known for their use of arson 
to discourage environmentally destructive practices, was deemed a major domestic terrorism 
threat by the FBI (AMSTER, 2006; JOOSSE, 2012), the news media often trivialized the group, 
and in one case described ELF adherent Craig Marshall as a “‘tree-hugger’” (JOOSSE, 2012, p. 82). 
Similarly, Turk argues that when “terrorism” is used by the public it 
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is far more likely to refer to incidents associated with agents and supporters of presumably foreign-
based…organizations…than with the violence of home-grown militants acting in the name of such 
groups as the Animal Liberation Front (TURK, 2004, pp. 272-273). 
 
An analysis of over 1,600 news stories on terrorism in the United States between 2001 and 2010 
finds that negative news reporting increases with relational distance (POWELL, 2011). Domestic 
perpetrators were often personalized and, in some cases, “labeled as being mentally unstable”, 
“smart”, or “intelligent” (Ibid., pp. 98-99). On the other hand, international perpetrators were often 
framed as extremists. Powell concludes that the media reporting of terrorism reflects the idea that 
“it is the outsider that is more of a threat than the one that walks among us” (Ibid., p. 98). 
In sum, the news reporting on familicide, gang violence, school and workplace shootings, 





Cultural characteristics that are more frequent in a society are more conventional (BLACK, 
2010 [1976]). The participants in every act of violence can be measured by their degree of cultural 
conventionality. An offense against a target with more conventionality is more serious, and 
attracts more social control, than an identical offense against a target with less conventionality 
(Ibid.). For example, religion is a cultural characteristic and in the United States Christianity is 
more conventional than Islam because there are more Christians than Muslims in the United 
States. Thus, an attack by a Muslim against a Christian in the United States should garner more 
social control than an identical attack in the opposite direction. Applying this logic to the news 
labeling of violence, I propose the following provisional formulation: “Terrorism” labeling is 
greater in response to attacks perpetrated against more conventional targets than against less 
conventional targets. 
First, consider national origin. Nationality is an indirect measure of culture because national 
origin is often associated with specific cultural behavior such as distinct manifestations of 
language, dress, and folklore. “Research has revealed”, Nacos writes, “that the U.S. media is more 
prone to label violent acts as ‘terrorism’ when U.S. citizens are involved than in cases without 
American involvement” (NACOS, 2007 [2002], p. 103).  Studying three major American 
newsmagazines between 1980 and 1988, Simmons and Lowry (1990) found that the “t-word was 
used in 79% of the cases when American citizens were targets, but in only 51% of the cases when 
no U.S. citizens were involved” (NACOS, 2007 [2002], pp. 103-104). In other words, violence is 
more likely to be labeled “terrorism” by American news outlets when Americans are targeted 
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compared to when non-Americans are targeted. The higher degree of “terrorism” framing by the 
American news media in response to violence targeting Americans is a function of the 
conventionality of the targets. 
As predicted, when Americans are the perpetrators of violence the likelihood that 
“terrorism” is reported by the American news media falls. Consider the 1994 attack by Dr. Baruch 
Goldstein. During prayer at the Ibrahimi Mosque on February 25th Goldstein opened fire leaving 
29 dead and over 100 Palestinians wounded. In the aftermath of the incident, “members of the 
American media characterized Goldstein’s deed as a massacre, a shooting rampage, murder, or 
mass murder, but not as an act of terrorism” (Ibid., p. 106). Because Goldstein was an American 
citizen, the attack was seen by American news outlets as committed by a culturally conventional 
perpetrator. As a result, rather than reporting the “terrorism” label, the news media used less 
severe labels (e.g., “murder”) to describe the attack. 
Now consider religion. The American media typically frames Muslim perpetrators of 
violence as “terrorists”. This is exactly what the cultural direction formulation predicts 
considering the unconventionality of Muslims in contemporary American society. The portrayal 
of Muslims as perpetrators of terrorism has been widespread in American popular culture for 
decades (SHAHEEN, 2000). Yet, as Edward Said (1997 [1981]) notes, the media’s labeling of 
Muslims (and Arabs) as “terrorists” is not isolated to the realm of Hollywood cinema. In fact, 
Muslims remain the most prone to being characterized as “terrorists” by the Western news media 
(see NACOS, 2007 [2002]). Specifically, 
 
The media in the United States and in other Western countries report on “Islamic” or “Muslim” terrorists 
and terrorism but not on “Christian” terrorists and terrorism, for instance in the context of…anti-abortion 
violence in the United States committed under the banner of the Christian “Army of God” (Ibid., p. 106). 
 
A set of recent experiments, looking at popular labeling instead of news labeling, provides 
additional evidence for the association between Islam and “terrorism”. West and Lloyd (2017) 
presented British participants with identical news articles that varied the religious characteristics 
of the perpetrators. As predicted, for the same attack, Muslim perpetrators were more likely to be 
labeled “terrorists” than non-Muslims. 
With that said, considering the conventionality of the perpetrator(s) or target(s) individually 
is misleading. When analyzing the social geometry of violence, the conventionality of both the 
perpetrator(s) and target(s) must be considered simultaneously. Consider the 2017 incident on 
Westminster Bridge in London. Khalid Masood deliberately hit several individuals with an 
automobile – killing four pedestrians – before entering the Palace of Westminster and fatally 
stabbing Police Constable Keith Palmer. Masood’s targets were largely white and Christian, while 
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Masood was black and Muslim. This attack received significant news coverage and negative 
framing. A search in LexisNexis Academic for “(Khalid Masood) and (terrorism or terrorist)” 
between March 22, 2017 and March 24, 2017 produces 455 newspaper articles from around the 
globe. In short, the “terrorism” frame was widely adopted by newspapers directly after the attack. 
A similar attack occurred three months later on June 19, 2017. The white Christian 
perpetrator, Darren Osborne, deliberately drove an automobile into a group of brown Muslims 
outside the Muslim Welfare House in London. Osborne’s attack resulted in the death of one 
individual. Like Masood’s attack, this incident received significant news coverage and negative 
framing. A LexisNexis Academic search for “(Darren Osborne) and (terrorism or terrorist)” 
between June 19, 2017 and June 21, 2017 produces 207 newspaper articles. 
Despite the adoption of the “terrorism” frame in response to Osborne’s attack, it was 
significantly less compared to Masood’s attack. In fact, Masood’s attack garnered over two times 
more newspaper articles containing the “terrorism” label than Osborne’s attack. Although these 
events are not identical, they do share some important characteristics such as being committed 
only three months apart, by one male, in London, and with the use of an automobile as the 
primary weapon. As a result, the observed variation in “terrorism” labeling between the two 
attacks can arguably be attributed to cultural direction—Masood’s attack was perpetrated against 
more conventional targets, while Osborne’s attack was perpetrated against less conventional 
targets. 
In sum, evidence suggests that “terrorism” labeling is greater in response to violence 
perpetrated by those who are culturally unconventional, such as foreigners and ethnic minorities, 




Organization is “the capacity for collective action” and can be measured by “the presence 
and number of administrative officers, the centralization and continuity of decision making, and 
the quantity of collective action itself” (BLACK, 2010 [1976], p. 85). The participants in every act 
of violence can be measured by their degree of organization. As a participant’s degree of 
organization increases so does their status. An act of violence against a principal with higher 
organizational status is treated as more serious, and attracts more social control, than an identical 
attack against a principal with lower organizational status. As a result, I propose the following 
provisional proposition: “Terrorism” labeling is greater in response to attacks perpetrated against 
more organized targets than against less organized targets. 
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When “terrorism” is discussed it often refers to “‘terrorism from below’” (CHOMSKY and 
HERMAN, 1979, p. 87). In other words, “terror” and “terrorism” “have generally been confined 
to the use of violence by individuals and marginal groups” (Ibid., p. 6). This is particularly true in 
the American context: 
 
According to the American discourse on “terrorism” as it has existed, virtually unchanged, since the mid-
1980s, the definition of “terrorism” is self-evident, and accepted by all. “Terrorism” is something that 
groups or individuals engage in, uses of force by States, especially Western ones, cannot amount to 
“terrorism” (BRULIN, 2015, p. 71). 
 
While there have been some discussions of state “terrorism” in American history (see BRULIN, 
2011), this labeling is rarely used in news reporting. Additionally, the existence of contemporary 
academic debates over whether states can be “terrorists” provides further support for “terrorism” 
being associated with perpetrators of low organizational status (see, e.g., STOHL and WIGHT, 2012). 
“Terror” as a function of upward attacks against more organized targets has been observed 
in news discourse: “terrorism as a frame…seems reserved only for individuals, sub-national 
groups, and pariah states” (quoted in PICARD, 1993, p. 100). For example, Time magazine 
between January and December 1986 was found “consistently [magnifying] the importance 
of…antistate terrorism” (STEUTER, 1990, p. 264). Similarly, violence in Latin America by left-
wing groups against U.S. allied states has garnered significant “terrorism” framing by major U.S. 
newspapers (EPSTEIN, 1977). Also consider environmental violence.  Environmental violence is 
often perpetrated by groups whose “organization is nonhierarchical [and] without formal 
membership” (BECK, 2007, p. 165). In most cases these groups average only a few individual 
members. On the other hand, the targets of environmental violence are often organizations such 
as private corporations. An analysis of 84 environmental attacks between 1998 and 2005 found 
that just under 60% targeted businesses, followed by private property, and finally the government 
(Ibid.). With the direction of most environmental violence occurring toward more organized 
targets it is not surprising these attacks are often labeled “eco-terrorism”. 
Mass violence also occurs in the opposite direction – against less organized targets. However, 
organizationally downward violence rarely elicits the “terrorism” label. For example, in May 1985 
the headquarters of the black organization MOVE, located in a rowhome on Osage Avenue in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was destroyed with a bomb dropped from a state police helicopter. 
Eleven people died, including five children. On the front page of the New York Times the 
following day, William K. Stevens (05/14/1985) labeled the incident a “confrontation” and the 
targets as “radicals” and an “armed group”. The perpetrators, law enforcement, did not garner 
any explicit labels besides being called the “authorities”. Seven years later, agents of the Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation and United States Marshals Service exchanged gun fire with Randy 
Weaver and his family (including a family friend) at their remote cabin in Idaho. The violence 
resulted in the deaths of one U.S. marshal and two members of the Weaver family. On September 
1, 1992, the New York Times labeled the incident an “11-day siege”, a “shootout”, and a “standoff” 
(EGAN, 09/01/1992). Weaver was labeled a “white-supremacist”. Again, agents of the state were 
able to avoid the “terrorist” label. 
In sum, evidence suggests that violence perpetrated by principals with low organizational 
status, such as individuals, against principals with high organizational status, such as states and 




Not only is there evidence that the principal disputants influence “terrorism” labeling, but 
also that third parties matter. Third parties encompass anyone with knowledge of the violence 
(e.g., witnesses and news outlets). Third parties vary in their degree of partisanship (BLACK, 1998 
[1993]). Partisanship is the extent to which a third-party takes a side in a conflict. On one end of 
the continuum are strong partisans – third parties who lend total support to a principal against 
another. On the other end of the continuum are nonpartisans – third parties who either remain 
uninvolved (cold nonpartisans) or are supportive to both principals and act to settle the dispute 
(warm nonpartisans). Principals attract partisan support from third parties whom they are 
socially close – intimate and culturally similar (Ibid.).  When third parties are partisan toward one 
principal and socially distant from the other, they often treat the latter as an enemy (Ibid.). As a 
result, when news outlets are positioned as third parties, the moral labeling of violence will often 
favor the principal whose side the outlet is socially closest. This logic implies a fourth provisional 
formulation: “Terrorism” labeling increases with the social closeness of news outlets to the 
target(s) and social distance from the perpetrator(s). In other words, “terrorism” labeling 
increases as the news outlet becomes more intimate with and culturally similar to the target(s) of 
violence, while at the same time becoming relationally and culturally distant from the 
perpetrator(s) (see Figure 1). 
Recall “that the U.S. media is more prone to label violent acts as ‘terrorism’ when U.S. citizens 
are involved than in cases without American involvement” (NACOS, 2007 [2002], p. 103). When 
United States citizens are targeted in an attack perpetrated by someone who is not a United States 
citizen, American news outlets are socially closer to the American targets than the foreign 
perpetrator. The social closeness between American news outlets and American targets increases 
the likelihood that the news outlets will become an ally to the targets and report the “terrorism” 
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label declaring the attack morally wrong. This proposition is supported by the fact that “terrorism” 
labeling diminishes “in cases without American involvement” (Idem). The absence of American 
targets indicates an increase in social distance between the targets and American outlets. As 
predicted, the result is less “terrorism” labeling. This is also demonstrated outside the United States. 
The media in Germany and Britain are more likely to label attacks “terrorism” when they are 
committed “at home or in Europe”, while simultaneously using less severe terms, such as “rebel”, 
“hijacking”, and “bombing”, when attacks are conducted abroad (Ibid., p. 104). 
 
Figure 1: Partisanship Structure of the “Terrorism” Label 
 
Source: Black (1998 [1993]). 
 
Social distance is measured by a combination of relational and cultural distance. Considering 
that “people are more likely to support a member of their own culture than a member of a different 
culture” (COONEY, 1998, p. 71), my fourth proposition predicts that the “terrorism” label is more 
likely to be reported when the perpetrators of violence hold  political views that are different from 
those held by the news outlets and journalists reporting on the violence (see OZYEGIN, 1986; 
PICARD, 1993). For example, in Turkey between 1976 and 1980 “terrorism” was found to be “used 
by the mass circulation center and right-wing newspapers to refer to left-wing political violence. 
Similarly, the left-wing press used the term to refer to right-wing political violence” (PICARD, 
1993, p. 100). A contemporary analysis on the framing of terror in three Turkish newspapers also 
found that the more politically different the perpetrators were to the political slant of the 
newspapers the more likely the perpetrators were emphasized and negatively framed in news 
reports (NARIN, 2011). Likewise, Le Figaro in France and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 
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Germany “make more frequent use of negative labels in portrayals of terrorist groups that they see 
as antagonistic to their own traditional national interests” (WEIMANN and WINN, 1994, p. 194). 
In the United States, one study found that newsmagazines used the “terrorist” label 72% of the time 
when perpetrators opposed U.S. policy compared to only 55% of the time when they were neutral 
to U.S. policy (SIMMONS and LOWRY, 1990). 
Consider a final example: the Boston Massacre. Within weeks after the March 5, 1770 attack 
on King Street in Boston, Massachusetts, “massacre” started to appear as a label in the local press 
(HINDERAKER, 2017). Along with ministers and orators, “newspaper editors reminded 
Americans of the streets ‘Stained with blood,’ ‘the piercing, agonizing groans,’ and ‘ye bloody 
butchers’ who served as tools of ‘this British Military Tyranny’” (RITTER and ANDREWS, 1978, 
p. 7). About a month after the event, a pamphlet titled A Short Narrative of the Horrid Massacre 
in Boston was published (HINDERAKER, 2017). Around the same time, testimonies of the 
incident were gathered at the behest of British officers, the contents of which were later published 
in the appendix of a pamphlet titled A Fair Account of the Late Unhappy Disturbance at Boston 
in New England (Ibid.). In short, those socially close to the targets expressed moral outrage in 
response to the attack, using “massacre” to describe the event.3 On the other hand, as 
demonstrated by the title of the pamphlet which contained the testimonies gathered by the British, 
social closeness to the perpetrators resulted in less severe labeling. 
In sum, only looking at the characteristics of the perpetrator(s) and target(s) of violence 
limits our ability to explain “terrorism” labeling.  Equally important are the news outlets reporting 
on the violence. Evidence suggests that the likelihood and frequency of “terrorism” labeling is 




Beyond the ‘Terrorism’ Label 
 
Morality is a quantitative variable that includes not only social control, but also social 
approval (COONEY, 2009). Recall that in addition to negative labels, news outlets may also report 
positive and neutral labels in response to violence. As a result, the next critical question is, what 
explains positive and neutral news labeling in response to violence? This question takes me 
beyond exploring variation in the likelihood and frequency of “terrorism” labeling, my primary 
concerns up until this point, and requires me to address variation in the severity of moral news 
labeling more broadly. Like my analysis of above, social geometry can help provide some answers. 
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By identifying the conditions under which violence is praised, geometric logic provides an 
alternative explanation for why “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”. Rather 
than being subjective or in the eye of the beholder, geometric logic predicts that the distinction 
between “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” partially results from the evaluators (e.g., news outlets) 
and their different relations to the principals.  Multiple news outlets may report different moral 
labels (e.g., “terrorism” and “liberation”) for the same act of violence because their respective 
relationships with the principals result in different geometries. While one news outlet may be 
socially close to the target(s) and socially distant from the perpetrator(s), another outlet may be 
socially close to the perpetrator(s) and socially distant from the target(s).  I argue that the latter 
configuration is conducive to positive labeling. Stated more formally: Positive news labeling 
increases with the social closeness of news outlets to the perpetrator(s) and social distance from 
the target(s). Furthermore, a third outlet may be equally close to both the perpetrator(s) and 
target(s) in the same act of violence. Again, this is known as warm nonpartisanship and results in 
neutrality. Thus, an additional provisional formulation can be stated as follows: Neutral news 
labeling is a direct function of the isosceles triangulation of social closeness between the three 
participants. Other outlets may be equally distant from both principals and ignore the violence 
entirely.  This is likely to occur when violence breaks out in a location that is socially remote from 
where the news outlet is stationed (e.g., a culturally distant foreign country). 
If positive, neutral, and negative news labeling is partially a function of social geometry, the 
evolution of moral news labeling in response to violence may also be explainable. In other words, 
it may be possible to partially explain and predict how moral news labeling changes over time. 
Specifically, due to the rise of the internet and electronic communications in recent decades, the 
assortment of digital media platforms, news organizations, and journalists have been expanding. 
This change may be resulting in more variation in geometric configurations for each act of 
violence and an increase in the variety of moral labels reported. This logic informs my final 





This paper focused on understanding variation in news labels of violence, which reflect moral 
judgments. The news labeling of violence is an aspect of social control and can be partially 
explained by the geometric configuration of violent acts. Specifically, I proposed that, all else 
constant, the likelihood and frequency of “terrorism” labeling in response to violence is greatest 
when a culturally unconventional and unorganized perpetrator, who is socially distant from the 
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news outlet reporting on the conflict, attacks a conventional and organized stranger who is 
socially close to the news outlet reporting on the conflict. Furthermore, I argued that as the social 
closeness between the news outlet, perpetrator, and target start to equalize, neutral labeling 
increases. Positive labeling, on the other hand, is likely to increase as the news outlet becomes 
more intimate with and culturally similar to the perpetrator of violence, while at the same time 
becoming relationally and culturally distant from the victim. Finally, I argued that the rise of 
electronic media is increasing the assortment of news outlets and journalists reporting on mass 
violence. This has likely resulted in an increase in the diversity of geometric configurations for 
each act of violence. And as diversity in geometric configurations increases, I would expect the 
variety of moral news labels reported in response to violence to also increase and agreement over 
how to label mass violence to decrease. 
These predictions, informed by my seven propositions, offer important contributions to the 
literatures on “terrorism” labeling and social control. First, my approach emphasizes variables, 
such as the relational distance between principals and the organizational direction of the attack, 
that have often been ignored in prior explanations of “terrorism” labeling. Second, my 
formulations are stated in terms of sociological variables and ignore speculation about 
psychological mindsets. As a result, the variables in my propositions are highly observable, 
making them easier to test. And it is a test of my formulations that is needed next. After all, the 
utility of an explanation is largely dependent on its validity. Third, my approach to “terrorism” 
labeling demonstrates that news labeling belongs to the family of social control. News labeling 
may be considered an act of justice like law, genocide, homicide, suicide, therapy, gossip, 
avoidance, and other forms of social control. However, unlike most theory and research on social 
control, my analysis of “terrorism” labeling explores the definition of deviance, not the response 
to deviance. Additionally, I move beyond prior work on therapeutic labeling and begin to address 




1 I would like to thank Casey Boches, Mark Cooney, Michele Dillon, Nicole Fox, James Tucker, and several anonymous 
reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts. 
2 Consider just a few definitions of terrorism.  Black defines terrorism in purely sociological terms: “self-help by organized 
civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians” (BLACK, 2004, p. 16).  Tilly cautions against the reification of 
the term and argues that terror is a strategy that refers to “asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against 
enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime” 
(TILLY, 2004, p. 5).  Others seek a definition informed by empirical analyses on how scholars use the term.  For example, 
Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler find that scholars tend to use terrorism to refer to “a politically motivated tactic 
involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role” (WEINBERG, 
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PEDAHZUR, and HIRSCH-HOEFLER, 2004, p. 786).  Nacos argues that with such disagreement over the meaning of 
terrorism, news outlets are often confused about when to label violence “terrorism”.      
3 The use of “terrorism” was uncommon at the time.  “Terrorism” became widely used as a media label in the early 1970s 
(ZULAIKA and DOUGLASS, 1996).   
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